



Penetration Testing Results Summary

Prepared For: Express Technologies Ltd
Target: EXPRESSVPN WINDOWS APPLICATIONS
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1 Document Distribution List

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2 Revision History

Version	Issue Date	Issued by	Comments
0.1	03 March 2024	Lim Shao Loong	Initial Draft
0.2	05 March 2024	Joshua Chan	Quality Assurance
1.0	06 March 2024	Lim Shao Loong	Final Version
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1.2	28 March 2024	Iain Wallace	Quality Assurance
2.0	01 April 2024	Lim Shao Loong	Final Version
3.0	05 April 2024	Lim Shao Loong	Revised Final Version
4.0	08 April 2024	Lim Shao Loong	Revised Final Version

3 Introduction

In March 2024, Express Technologies Ltd engaged Nettitude to conduct a penetration test on the ExpressVPN Windows Applications. The primary objective of this assessment was to ensure that the DNS leak vulnerability related to the split tunnelling feature found in versions v12.72.0.6 and v10.50.0.2 has been remediated.

The following components were tested as part of the engagement:

Component	Description
ExpressVPN for Windows v12.74.0.19 binaries ExpressVPN for Windows v10.51.0.9 binaries	DNS leak vulnerability related to split tunnelling feature was observed in Windows v12.72.0.6 and v10.50.0.2 binaries. The scope of work is to ensure that the patched binaries v12.74.0.19 and v10.51.0.9 have effectively addressed the DNS leak vulnerability in Windows 10 and 11.

During the period of engagement, the new binaries v12.74.0.19 and v10.51.0.9 were tested and deemed to have effectively addressed the DNS leak vulnerability related to the split tunnelling feature. However, a new vulnerability was observed in the v12.74.0.19 and v10.51.0.9 binaries, and has since been fixed. The patched v10 application (v10.53) is available through a direct download link with split tunnelling disabled, effectively resolving the issue. Additionally, the download option on the ExpressVPN website for v10 is removed, thus decommissioning v10 of the Windows application.

This report will address how Nettitude was able to replicate the DNS leak vulnerability, how the new binaries effectively addressed the issues, and finally, the new vulnerability that was observed during the testing period and its remediation.

4 Analysis: ExpressVPN Windows Applications

The ExpressVPN Windows binaries, versions v12.72.0.6 and v10.50.0.2, were found to be affected by a DNS leak vulnerability related to the split tunnelling feature. The split tunnelling feature allows users to selectively choose which applications go through the VPN route and which do not. However, two specific conditions were identified that trigger the DNS leakage.

The two conditions that trigger the DNS leakage and affected specific versions are outlined below:

First Condition – Other VPN applications were installed on the Windows machine.

- v12.72.0.6
- v10.50.0.2

Second Condition – DNS Resolver Cached.

- v12.72.0.6

Nettitude then proceeded to replicate the DNS leak vulnerability using the vulnerable versions provided by Express Technologies Ltd.

4.1 Setup of Testing Environment

The following table details the setup of the testing environment for this engagement:

Operating Systems	Applications Installed	ExpressVPN Binaries Tested
Windows 11 (Host Machine), Windows 11 (Virtual Machine)	Google Chrome, NordVPN, IPVanish, SurfShark	v12.72.0.6, v10.50.0.2, v12.74.0.19, v10.51.0.9, v12.75.0.18
Windows 10 (Host Machine), Windows 10 (Virtual Machine)	Google Chrome, NordVPN, IPVanish, SurfShark	v12.72.0.6, v10.50.0.2, v12.74.0.19, v10.51.0.9, v12.75.0.18

The default Internet Service Provider (ISP) used for this engagement is SingNet as shown in the screenshot below:




Figure 1: Default ISP, DNS result from ipleak.net.

4.2 Replication of the DNS Leak Vulnerability

4.2.1 First Condition – Other VPN Applications Installed

The following screenshots demonstrate the first condition (Other VPN Applications Installed) to trigger the DNS leak vulnerability:




Figure 2: Vulnerable v12.72.0.6 and other VPN applications installed with split tunnelling turned on.

The screenshot above provides details of the setup process for triggering a DNS leak. The ExpressVPN application, along with other VPN applications (namely NordVPN, IPVanish, and Surfshark), were installed on both Windows 10 and Windows 11 systems.

All the setups mentioned are configured with the same split tunnelling feature enabled with “Google Chrome” selected as the application to route through the VPN.

The identical setup and testing environment were also applied to the vulnerable v10.50.0.2 version of the ExpressVPN application. The presence of the other VPN applications listed in this report, when installed on the same machine, consistently triggered the DNS leak issue without any additional actions required beyond installation.

It’s noteworthy that, during testing, some systems experienced a DNS leak with only one of the other VPN applications installed.

After connecting to the ExpressVPN application with split tunnelling enabled, a DNS leak occurred where the service provider (SingNet) is still present in the DNS server list, as shown below:




Figure 3: DNS leak occurred.

4.2.2 Second Condition – DNS Resolver Cached

The following screenshots demonstrate the second condition (DNS Resolver Cached) to trigger the DNS leak vulnerability:




Figure 4: Vulnerable v12.72.0.6 application installed with split tunnelling turned on.

The DNS leak based on the second condition was triggered by implementing the same setup as the first condition, excluding other VPN applications that were installed.

Nettitude then proceeded to perform several DNS queries to ensure the DNS resolver was cached. This can be achieved through dnsleaktest.com. Following this, connecting to a VPN profile that is geographically distant from the current location resulted in the DNS leak illustrated below.

The screenshot shows the iplak.net interface with the following sections:

- Your IP addresses:** 185.198.243.63, United Kingdom, Clouvider Limited. Status: IPv6. Note: No forwarded IP detected.
- Your IP addresses - WebRTC detection:** Browser default: IPv4 (203 ms), Fallback: Fail (timeout).
- DNS Addresses - 54 servers detected, 82 tests:**
 - 165.21.83.154, Singapore, SingNet, 25 hit
 - 165.21.83.157, Singapore, SingNet, 16 hit
 - 2001:c20:18:9:d, Singapore, SingNet, 3 hit
 - 185.198.243.67, United Kingdom, Clouvider Limited, 1 hit
 - 165.21.83.152, Singapore, SingNet, 25 hit
 - 2001:c20:18:9:9, Singapore, SingNet, 9 hit
 - 185.198.243.45, United Kingdom, Clouvider Limited, 5 hit
 - 45.89.242.136, United Kingdom - England, Clouvider Limited, 3 hit

An ExpressVPN overlay is visible on the right, showing 'Connected' status and 'Current Location: UK - Docklands'.

Figure 5: DNS leakage observed from iplak.net results.

4.3 Remediation of the DNS Leak Vulnerability

During the testing period, the tested application versions v12.74.0.9 and v10.51.0.9 successfully resolved the DNS leakage, as shown below:

4.3.1 First Condition – Other VPN Applications Installed (Remediated)




Figure 6: Patched v12.74.0.19 and other VPN applications installed with split tunnelling turned on.

Nettitude performed the same tests on the new binaries using the setup detailed in section 4.2.1, utilizing several DNS leak tools (such as ipleak.net and dnsleaktest.com) to ensure that the issue was resolved. The initial DNS leak vulnerability triggered by the first condition – “other competing VPN applications installed” were deemed to have been effectively remediated by the new binaries v12.74.0.19 and v10.51.0.9.




Figure 7: DNS leakage no longer occurs (ipleak.net).

4.3.2 Second Condition – DNS Resolver Cached (Remediated)




Figure 8: DNS leakage no longer occurs (dnsleaktest.com).

Nettitude replicated the same tests on the new binary using the setup detailed in section 4.2.2, employing the same tools mentioned above to verify the resolution of the issue. The initial DNS leak vulnerability triggered by the second condition, DNS resolver cached issue, was determined to have been effectively remediated by the new binary v12.74.0.19.

4.4 IP Leak and Misconfigured VPN Profile

While the DNS leak issue was resolved, it was observed that the patched ExpressVPN application v12.74.0.19 and v10.51.0.9 binaries introduced another bug, leading to the leakage of the ISP's IP or being assigned to a misconfigured VPN profile for browser applications as shown in the screenshots below:




Figure 9: ISP's IP was leaked through the patched applications (Virtual Machine).




Figure 10: Incorrect VPN profile assigned through the patched applications (Physical Host Machine).

The newly identified issue was reported to the respective teams, and it was quickly narrowed down. The team released a newly patched application, v12.75.0.18, to address the issue, and a retest confirmed its successful remediation.

The patched v10 application (v10.53) is available through a direct download link with split tunnelling disabled, effectively resolving the issue. Additionally, the download option on the ExpressVPN website for v10 is removed, thus decommissioning v10 of the Windows application.

The newly identified issue stemmed from NordVPN's Threat Protection (Web Protection) feature (left in its default state after installation), which either displayed a misconfigured VPN profile or leaked the ISP's IP address, depending on whether the machine used was virtual or physical, within the split tunnelling feature.

The following screenshots depict that the issue has been remediated:




Figure 11: Correct VPN profile is now assigned with NordVPN's Web Protection

5 Overview of Findings

5.1 Finding Summary

Nettitude identified a total number of one finding during the engagement. The following table shows the categorisation by severity:



5.2 ExpressVPN Windows Applications Summary

Component	Description	Status
v12.74.0.19, v10.51.0.9	DNS Leak Vulnerability	Remediated
V12.75.0.18	IP Leak and Misconfigured VPN Profile	Remediated
v10.x	IP Leak and Misconfigured VPN Profile	Decommissioned due to removal of split tunnelling in v10.53



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